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Introduction
The concepts of security and insecurity have been forever
associated with scholarly contemplation on international
relations. Thucydides wrote that "real reason" for the
Peloponnesian War was linked to rising insecurity among
the Spartans: "What made war inevitable was the growth of
Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."1
More than two millennia later a similar idea is echoed: "The
feeling of insecurity, and the fears which it engenders, are
undoubtedly the strongest potential causes of war in the
world today."2
Nonetheless, the conceptual arena of security has
remained impoverished by the reluctance of international
relations scholars to subject it to thorough scrutiny and
sustained examination. It should be observed, for example,
that the most influential textbook in international relations,
namely Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, did not address the idea
of security directly. For the most part the analysis of security
was married to the dominant state-centric/anarchic-systemic
model of international relations. Outside this Realist
framework the concept of security was emptied largely of
meaning or sensibility.
This condition started to change by the early 1980s.
Initially, a group of scholars began to systematically redefine
the concept of security in a manner that directed attention
towards the limited opportunity that "military" responses
offered to "security" problems. Their primary activity was to
redefine security in terms of an expanded idea to "threat," with
the implication of these efforts necessarily questioning the
appropriateness of military solutions - a politically important
position given the thrust of Reaganism at that time. With the
emergence of a clear post-positivist trend within IR by the
late 1980s, however, a number of scholars began to address
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redefinitional efforts along axiological, conceptual and empirical
grounds. These latter efforts - herein identified as an Alternative
school - yielded important intellectual sanction for political
movements, including women's organizations, aboriginal
peoples, labour groups, the urban poor and the ecological
movement, that often broach ideas of security within the
context of a broader transformative agenda. International
relations scholarship is arriving at the point, that is, where
the breadth of intellectual activity regarding security reflects
its polypolitical imbrications at the global and local levels.
An exposition of the full scope of this novel critical line
is the primary purpose of this paper.
Development of the Concept of Security
Perhaps the most striking thing about the concept of security
within the field of international relations in the post-war
period was its undertreatment. Although always implicitly
central to any analytical framework within the field of
international relations, the need to develop the concept
appears to have been overridden by the attention given to the
more central organizing concept of power. It is instructive to
observe that the main text book in international relations
failed to explore the concept of security directly.3 Barry
Buzan has identified five reasons for the conceptual
underdevelopment of security. First, the idea of security is
too complex and has therefore been bypassed in favour of
more manageable ideas. Secondly, he notes the overlap
between the concept of security and that of power. "In the
Realist orthodoxy," Buzan writes, "power dominated both as
end and as means. Security necessarily shrank conceptually
to being a way of saying either how well any particular state
or allied group of states was doing in the struggle for power,
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or how stable the balance of power overall appeared to be."4
As a third point, Buzan notes that the assortment of revolts
against the Realist tradition within international relations
have tended to shy away from the concept of security. With
respect to the literature on interdependence, for example, he
notes that the "inclination was to push the traditional,
military power-oriented Realist model into the background,
seeing its competitive, fragmented, force-based approach as
increasingly irrelevant to the interwoven network world of
international political economy." The nature of Strategic
Studies as a sub-field lies behind the fourth reason for the
conceptual underdevelopment surrounding security. Buzan
notes that Strategic Studies has conventionally offered a
shorter-term policy oriented perspective, has been directly
linked to Anglo-American defense needs, and has a primary
concern with military matters. As Buzan notes: "Security is
about much more than military capability and relations, and
this ... has made Strategic Studies an infertile seedbed for the
further growth of the concept." Finally, and perhaps most
provocatively, Buzan claims that any definitiveness around
the idea of security would undermine the utility derived from
its symbolic ambiguity:
An undefined notion of national security offers scope for
power-maximising strategies to political and military
elites, because of the considerable leverage over
domestic affairs which can be obtained by invoking it.
While such leverage may sometimes be justified, as in
the case of Britain's mobilisation during the Second
World War, the natural ambiguity of foreign threats
during peacetime makes it easy to disguise more sinister
intentions in the cloak of national security... Cultivation
of hostile images abroad can justify intensified political
surveillance, shifts of resources to the military, and other
such policies with deep implications for the conduct of
domestic political life. At an extreme, the need for
national security can even be evoked as a reason for not
discussing it.5
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Consequently, for most of the post-war period, the field of
international relations paradoxically employed the concept
of security but failed to subject it to any critical scrutiny.
Two notable exceptions to this trend appeared during
the 1950s. The first was John Herz's discussion of the
security dilemma.6 In his response to the various forms of
"Idealist Internationalism" Herz posited an account of
international relations which placed the concept of security
at the centre of analysis. His first move was to observe that
whenever we find a constellation of groups or social units
that are not organized into a "higher unity" there arises the
condition known as the security dilemma:
Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must
be, and usually are, concerned about their security from
being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by
other groups or individuals. Striving to attain security
from such an attack, they are driven to acquire more and
more power in order to escape the impact of the power of
others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and
compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can
ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing
units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of
security and power accumulation is on.7
One mechanism of the power struggle for Herz is the
unending consolidation of lower groups into intermediate
and better organized groups. This process culminates in the
"extreme manifestation" of the security dilemma in
international relations:
This homo homini lupus situation does not preclude social
cooperation as another fundamental fact of social life.
But even cooperation and solidarity tend to become
elements in the conflict situation, part of their function
being the consolidation and the strengthening of
particular groups in their competition with other groups.
The struggle for security, then, is merely raised from the
individual or lower-group level to a higher-group level.
Thus, families and tribes may overcome the power game
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in their internal relations in order to face other families
or tribes; larger groups may overcome it to face other
classes unitedly; entire nations may compose their
internal conflicts in order to face other nations.8
The security dilemma, according to Herz, constitutes an
intractable feature of human life in the condition of anarchy,
especially within the field of international relations. In
international politics there have been two traditional
responses: "Either the approach has been expressive of a
utopian and often chiliastic Political Idealism, or - when
disillusionment with the idealist's ability to mould the
`realist' fact frustrates expectations - it has taken refuge in an
equally extreme, power-political and power-glorifying
Political Realism."9
Herz's formulation contains the common observation
that rising spirals of power are associated with falling spirals
of insecurity. On the other hand, however, it contains the
novel observation that the engine of this dynamic is the
struggle for security itself. Power is reduced to the status of
an instrumentality. Herz's formulation of the security
dilemma challenges the conventional power-centred model
of international relations, but it was a challenge that was not
taken up analytically. This has the effect of confirming, at
least to some degree, the ambiguity surrounding the concept
of security, as well, at least in the sense that the challenge
does not appear to have been recognized, that the concepts
of security and power have been collapsed into each other,
and treated, to a large extent, synonymously: "Reduced to
little more than a synonym for power," Buzan reminds us,
"security could have little independent relevance in wider
systemic terms, and therefore the security dilemma approach
could function at best as a minor adjunct to the power model
of international relations."10
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The second exception appeared in Arnold Wolfers'
discussion of the increasingly widespread appeals to
`national security' in the immediate post-war period.11 For
Wolfers, this appeal is "understandable" in view of the Cold
War and the threat of external aggression, especially when
compared with earlier periods when the focus of national
attention would have been tilted towards the depression and
the need for social reform. The problem, however, is that the
idea of national security is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant
serious concern. He notes that this ambiguity "may be
permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favours with
an attractive and possibly deceptive name."12 Wolfers claims
that "it would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol of
national security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic
confusion," that we "know roughly" what is meant by it, but
that it still "leaves room for more confusion than sound
political counsel or scientific usage can afford."13 He is
motivated by the concern that the "term security covers a
range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be
interpreted as policies of security."14 In an attempt to clarify
the idea of national security, Wolfers identifies three distinct
phases through which decision makers must pass. First, he
speaks of security in terms of the protection of `national'
values previously acquired, and refers to Walter Lippmann's
idea that "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in
danger of having to sacrifice core values." While these
values are not a `given' for Wolfers, that is, that decision
makers must define them, it is clear this difficulty should not
be overdrawn. He matter of factly stresses that "national
independence" must rank high "not merely for its own sake
but for the guarantee it may offer to values like liberty,
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justice, and peace."15 Secondly, the appropriate "level" of
security must be targeted by decision makers in recognition
of the fact that "efforts for security are bound to be
experienced as a burden..."16 Wolfers writes that a number of
different factors including the salience of external threats,
national character and convention will influence the degree
of security that a nation targets. Finally, decision makers
must find the "means" to obtain the targeted level of
security: "It may be good advice in one instance to appeal
for greater effort and more armaments; it may be no less
expedient and morally advisable in another instance to call
for moderation and for greater reliance on means other than
coercive power."17. Consequently, Wolfers drew attention to
the political nature of appeals to `national security', and
attempted to minimize this ambiguity by identifying the
process through which national security could be established.
Redefining the National Security Problem
Although Wolfers and Herz threw down the conceptual
gauntlet, the concept of security remained in an emaciated
state for most of the post-war period. Beginning in the late
1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s, however, there
has been a flurry of intellectual activity around the concept
of security. This intellectual effort received stimulus from
two high profile reports that chiselled at the edges of
conventional views of security. The first was the Bruntland
Report by the World Commission on the Environment and
Development entitled Our Common Future. The second was the
Palme Report by the Independent Commission on
Disarmament and Security Issues entitled Common Security: A Blueprint
for Survival.18 These studies contained a number of pivotal themes,
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especially the need to demilitarize the concept of security,
that were simultaneously scrutinized in the scholarly
literature. This revitalized inquiry into security contains two
basic directions. The first concerns the attempt to afford the
concept its due, so to speak, by expanding its relevance in
international relations theory. The second, and by far most
energized efforts, are focused upon the need to expand the
definition of the concept of security beyond its more
conventional militaristic connotations.
The first theme develops the status of the concept of
security in international relations. The first attempt at this
may be found in Barry Buzan's Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts
in the Study of International Relations.19 Buzan begins by noting that the basic
concepts of power and peace have dominated the field of
international relations: "The concept of power emphasises the
parts of the international system at the expense of the whole,
and the dynamic of conflict at the expense of harmony. It
does, however, identify a factor which is universal both as a
motive for behaviour and as a description of the relative
status of actors. The concept of peace emphasises both the
international system as a whole, and individuals as its
ultimate building bloc, at the expense of states, and
emphasises the dynamic of harmony at the expense of that of
conflict. Its principal focus is on a possible universal
condition." This fundamental conceptual dichotomy, Buzan
notes, has yielded a broad dissatisfaction. The basic
opposition between the power perspective of international
relations and the peace perspective has engendered
contradictory results. Up to a point it provides valuable
criticism and "creates incentives to sharpen and deepen
thinking." But we have now arrived at a point, according to
Buzan, whereby the conceptual polarization has inhibited
intellectual development: "Opposition become
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institutionalised and politicised, and creative thinking is
either overridden by the rituals of intellectual entrenchment,
or stifled by the lack of creative room within the tight
contradictory confines of the peace/power dilemma."
In view of this conceptual ossification, Buzan offers us
the concept of security "as a synthesis" between the two
contending poles. He begins by observing that the struggle
for security is a basic condition of international relations:
"The basic problem which underlies almost all interest in
international relations is insecurity." He stresses that the power
perspective and the peace perspective are valuable to the extent
that they have offered insight on this basic problem. But
their ability to address the struggle for `security' is
insufficient. The power and peace perspectives have at best
offered "a partial view of the security problem." Buzan
stresses the need to view the struggle for state security as an
impetus by itself: "If security is recognised as an important
motive for behaviour in the international system, then it
provides a view of international relations which is quite
distinct from that which sees security merely as a possible
outcome of power relations." Through the aperture of
security as a "broader behavioural motive" for states, then,
Buzan blends the Power (Realist) and Peace (Idealist)
perspectives in order to create a "realist-idealism." The power
and peace perspective, he reiterates, have offered an
increasingly sclerotic view of both the international anarchy
and the arms race. In their place, he offers the reader the security
perspective, which takes as its starting point the struggle against
insecurity among states. Regardless of the aptness of his
characterization of the two contending views of international
relations, and regardless of the tenable nature of his `blend'
solution, it is important that Buzan has explicitly treated the
concept of security as much more than mere outcome in the
struggle for power. The struggle for security is a distinct
behavioural motive in its own right. In an important manner,
the original views of Herz have been resurrected and used as
a springboard to construct a `third' perspective in
international relations.
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Mohammed Ayoob's work on the Third World also
offers us an opportunity to see the concept of security
assigned a weightier role in the behavioural calculus of
states. Ayoob posits the concept of security as the matrix of
state behaviour. Ayoob contends that the seemingly
contradictory behaviour of Third World states as an
`intrusive collectivity bent on reordering the international
order' on the one hand and as individual states `trying to
maintain some semblance of political and economic stability'
on the other are manifestations of "two sides of the same
security coin for these new members of the system of
states."20 More specifically, the struggle to reorder the rules
more favourably to Third World states reflects the struggle
for international status. "The perceived security if not the
survival of these states," he writes, "hinges upon the terms
on which they interact with the dominant powers of the
global `north'." At the same time, the salience of internal
security threats predisposes individual Third World states to
protect the world order as far as possible. Ayoob concludes
that the contradictory behaviour is more apparent than real,
reflecting basic considerations of security in both cases. In
a manner reminiscent of Herz's original formulations on the
subject, Ayoob also suggests that security concerns are the
ultima ratio of state behaviour, and that considerations of ` power'
and `status' take on an epiphenomenal hue. In the end,
Morgenthau's axiom of "interest defined as power" is
dramatically reworded as "interest defined as security."
The second, an equally important trend within the
definitional school of security studies has been the struggle to
broaden the meaning of security. The central theme in this
respect has been the expansion of the idea of security beyond
the military realm. The need to view security in terms which
move beyond the narrowness of military solutions was made
poignantly clear in the Palme Report:
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... the perceived requirements of national security dictate
that nations maintain military forces adequate to the
dangers posed to their security - dangers from within and
from without. But the realities are such that military strength alone
cannot provide real security. By every index of military strength it is
evident that most nations have become more powerful
over the years. Yet, judged by the increasingly strident
tone of international and domestic debates about these
issues, it is also clear that greater national military might
has not led to a greater sense of national security... if the
world is to approach even the possibility of achieving
true security - ending the danger of nuclear war, reducing
the frequency and destructiveness of conventional
conflicts, easing the social and economic burdens of
armaments - important changes are necessary in the way that nations look at questions of
armaments and security.21
This thrust has its parallel within the scholarly literature on
security: "The concern for the security of a nation is
undoubtedly as old as the nation state itself, but since World
War II the concept of `national security' has acquired an
overwhelmingly military character."22 Another writer notes
that "much writing and most political debate about ` national
security policy' seem obsessed these days with the inputs to
military defense (weapons systems, manpower, logistics, and
research and development on military technology) and the
planning, strategy, and tactics of organized violence."23 In his
assessment of the concept of security Richard Ullman argues
that American national security has been defined in
"excessively narrow and excessively military terms."24
Ullman argues that militaristic notions of security guide
American political leaders, and may cause them to miss
potentially even more harmful dangers while leading to the
excessive militarization of international affairs. In order to
avoid this path Ullman explicitly calls for "a more
comprehensive definition of security."
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As part of this expanded notion of security these writers
focus upon an expanded notion of threat. The logic behind
this move is rather straightforward. If threats are no longer
of a military nature, then a military response is simply
inappropriate. In the context of oil supplies Lester Brown
demonstrates this logic:
The overwhelmingly military approach to national
security is based on the assumption that the principal
threat to security comes from other nations. But the
threat to security may now arise less from the
relationship of nation to nation and more from the
relationship of man to nature. Dwindling reserves of oil
... now threaten the security of nations everywhere.
National security cannot be maintained unless national
economies can be sustained, but, unfortunately, the
health of many economies cannot be sustained much
longer without major adjustments. All advanced
industrial economies are fuelled primarily by oil, a
resource that is being depleted. While military strategists
have worried about the access of industrial economies to
Middle Eastern oil, another more serious threat, the
eventual exhaustion of the world's oil supplies, has been
moving to the fore.25
The notion that military solutions can be inappropriate for
some security problems was most succinctly expressed in the
Palme Report: "There are, of course, no military solutions to
`environmental insecurity'."26
Richard Ullman proceeds to expand the concept of
security by similarly expanding the notion of threats. Ullman
notes that not all threats to the state are immediately obvious,
external and military in nature. Rather, Ullman seeks to draw
attention to the less apparent, internal, non-military threats
to the state including environmental degradation, resource
depletion, terrorism, natural catastrophes and the chronic
instability of major Third World states. In the process the
concept of national security is expanded to accommodate a wide
variety of `threats' beyond the military sphere. Another
example of an expanded notion of threat may be found in
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Azar and Moon's Third World National Security: Toward a New Conceptual Framework.27
Working with an expanded concept of security which
includes military, economic, ecological and ethnic
considerations, Azar and Moon argue that we must examine
the complexity which can surround the nature of threats.
Each dimension of security, they argue, has an array of
corresponding threat types requiring different policies. A
military threat may be overt and external, for example,
whereas economic threats can be subtle and internal in
nature. In order to understand the security dilemma as it
faces most Third World states we must, according to Azar
and Moon, take these subtle and complex threats into
account.
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing throughout
the 1980s, then, the definitional school attempted to revive and
rework the concept of security. The task was largely related
to finding the appropriate definition of national security. This
approach sought to provide an expanded view of threats to
states, and thereby stressed that the security response of
states must move beyond the narrow military realm. The
problem of national security was uncritically accepted as the central
animating concern. The highly political, but seldom
recognized, assumption that the problem of security for the
state, operationalized and addressed in terms of the national security
problematic, should form the legitimate point of scholarly
departure was never called into question. Within the context
of this uncritical posing of the fundamental issue we see
writers drawing attention to politically suspect definitions of
national security:
In the absence of a consensus on fundamental issues and
in the absence of open political debate and contest, many
of these [Third World] states are ruled by regimes with
narrow support bases - both politically and socially -
which usually come to power by means of a coup d'etat
and which hang on so tenaciously to office that they have
14Workman /     
28 Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World,"
in Regional Security in the Third World, (Westview Press, 1986), p. 11.
29 For example, see R.B.J. Walker, The Concept of Security and International Relations,
Working Paper no. 3, Institute on global Conflict and
Cooperation, University of California; Paul A. Chilton, The
Container Concept of Security: A Cognitive Linguistic Approach, (Unpublished); D.
to be, more often than not, physically liquidated to pave
the way for any form of political transition. Since it is
these regimes, and their bureaucratic and intellectual
hangers-on, who define the threats to the security of their
respective states, it is no wonder that they define it
primarily in terms of regime security rather than the
security of the society as a whole. Security ... has been
traditionally defined as the protection and preservation of
core values. However, in the case of many Third World
states, the core values of the regime - with self-
preservation at the very core of this core - are often at
extreme variance with the core values cherished by large
segments of the populations over whom they rule. Once
again, given these discrepancies in the definition of core
values and, indeed, of security itself, it is no wonder that
major threats to the security of these regimes emanate
from within their own societies.28
As this quote demonstrates, the definitional school could
suggestively draw attention to the political nature of security
problems, and acknowledge that other `subjects' of security
must be considered. Nonetheless, there was no meaningful
movement away from the view that the national security problem is
basic and fundamental. The above quote, as an example, is
not a repudiation of the basic orientation of the intellectual
project but rather a heartfelt acknowledgement that some
definitions of national security can be seriously called into
question.
The Alternative School of Security Studies
Beginning in the late 1980s a group of scholars began laying
the foundations for a radically different approach to the
analysis of security in international relations. According to
this emerging view, any analysis of security in international
relations that begins and ends with the national security problem is
far too narrow in its concern.29 International relations
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analysts, they argue, can no longer be content to search for
the appropriate ` meaning' or ` definition' of national security.
The concept of security, rather, must be decoupled, delinked,
disengaged or disentangled from the national security problem.30
"By displacing the state as the sole focus of analytic
attention," Simon Dalby has written, "critical research allows
consideration of the broader aspects of politics, seen
properly as a broad concept of how society is organized."
Ultimately, these writers analyze the concept of security in
terms of a broader social and cultural matrix. The explicit
call is for a socially and culturally centred analysis which
thoroughly supplants the state focused national security problem.
Perhaps the title of Rob Walker's programmatic The Concept
of Security and International Relations succinctly and unambiguously
commences the narrative of the Alternative group, suggesting as
it does that the concept of security has a social usages and
intellectual meanings beyond the narrow appropriation of
international relations.31 Walker expresses concern at the
paradoxical and "deeply disturbing" silence surrounding the
concept of security: "The concept of security remains on the
margin of contemporary political discourse in a way that is
at odds with the importance of security policies in
contemporary political life." Walker directly confronts the
intellectual silence which cloaks the concept. He argues that
the prevailing categorical schemes or conceptual structures
of the international relations discipline - Realism/Idealism,
community/anarchy, friend/enemy - rest upon a very strict
exclusion between life inside the state and life outside the state. Walker draws
upon post-structuralism's thorough critique of the philosophy
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of identity, a conceptual constellation that has been central
to Western thought. He contends that the basic categories
and conceptual schemes of international relations thought
reflects the tendency to fetishize the moment of unity -
community or life inside the state - and to subordinate the
moment of difference - anarchy or life outside the state - to
it. Perhaps the most striking conceptual casualty of these
discursive practices within the international relations
discipline has been treatment of the concept of the `state'.
Although central to the discipline of international relations,
it is understood primarily in spatial terms and as the sole
locus of political identity, and has escaped any serious and
sustained examination.
It is against this backdrop that the concept of security
has been introduced into the dominant discourse of
international relations. This peculiar appropriation within the
field of international relations, according to Walker, has been
informed by the view which sees "the state as the primary
locus of political life." As Walker writes: "The concept of
national security is a consequence of the theory of the state
as the Sovereign locus of political identity." Security is a
problem of the outside of the state: "The most important characteristic
of the concept of security is neither that it is essentially contested nor
that it is silent but that it is derivative from and dependent upon
an historically specific conception of political community."
The focus upon the national security problem is the product of the
view of the state as the exclusive basis of political
community. Indeed, his most basic conclusion is that only by
breaking the equation of security with identity, of security
with community or life inside the state will a critical approach to
security develop. It is valuable to observe Walker at length:
The fact that international relations theory has depended
on only the sketchiest outlines of a theory of the state has
mattered surprisingly little to a discipline that has been
so self-conscious about the primacy of the state. It has
only been necessary to be sure that the distinction
between inside and outside, between politics and
relation, between community and anarchy, could be
maintained as an absolute exclusion. However
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appropriate this formulation may have been in the past -
it has, arguably, always been misleading - it is difficult
to sustain in a world in which states are both growing
"stronger" in some sense but are also increasingly
embedded in complex global structure whose contours
do not conform to the expectation of a global Leviathan.
Walker draws his line of argumentation to conclusion:
The issue is not whether the state is obstinate or obsolete;
or whether "realism" expresses a recognition of tragic
necessity and idealism is merely a dangerous naivety; or
whether drawing on the "domestic analogy" is a sign of
professional incompetence; or any other version of the
false choice between the community of identity within
and the difference - the barbarian, the other, the anarchy
without. In this sense, the problem with the claims of
realism on which the concept of national security
depends is its simultaneous rejection yet deeper
acceptance of idealism, of the priority of the moment of
identity against which the tragedy of the "security
dilemma" can be measured. This priority produces the
problem of national security. Concepts of peace that
build upon this same priority cannot provide a way out.
The silence of prevailing concepts of security - and peace
- can only be broken by refusing the equation of security
with identity, and thus with the obliteration of difference:
a refusal that necessarily constitutes a struggle for new
forms for political community.
The analysis of security in international relations, in other
words, has heretofore been incarcerated by the naturalization
of an historically specific conception of political community.
The state cannot be continued to be viewed as the `natural'
or even `obligatory' sight of political community. We must
move beyond these Procrustean barriers to contemplate
security in terms of a wider social and cultural matrix that
necessarily embraces alternative questions of political
practice and political community.
From another quarter we see Mick Dillon's
embellishments upon the rather abstract ideas on the
`subject' of security. Dillon reproaches those `modern'
discussions of security which assume that the subject of
security - individuals or states - are unproblematically
constituted outside of language. He argues that the common
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`referential' view of language, whereby words `refer' to
things or essences, has been extended to the idea of ` identity'
of the ` subject'. That is, the subject (of security) is conceived
of "as an essence; something autonomous, standing outside
language and beyond our way of representing it, but which
our modes of representation should seek as accurately as
possible to reflect."32 Dillon calls attention to the ` constitutive
view of language', a view that sees language as not merely
referring to the presence of an external world but rather as
actively constituting it: "We have language, but how often
do we discover, and not only through the pre-eminently
playful language games of humour, that we are had by it." It
follows from this view that we must revise our conception of
the subject (of security), and especially, of the manner in
which its `identity' comes to be formed. Conventional
conceptions of `identity' tend to attribute order and unity to
the inside, he notes, and privilege and value these qualities
over the disorder on the outside. The notion of `boundary'
was understandably regarded as the barrier which preserved
internal order (of the individual, group or state) from the
disorder of the external world. According to Dillon,
however, a constitutive view of language forces us to
reconsider the very notion of boundary:
... it is the boundary that "differentiates between inside
and outside", and hence the boundary should be elevated
in our attention because it is the structure which produces
mutually-defining perspectives. Though the boundary is
commonly thought to belong to the system (individual,
groups or state), giving it shape and form, it necessarily
also shapes the environment. Hence the system is just as
much inside the environment (actively shaping it), as the
environment is inside the system (actively shaping that
too). Thus the boundary has to be conceived not as an
inert thing belonging either to the system or its
environment, but as an active process of differentiation
which serve system and environment equally. Neither the
inside (order, community, identity or system), nor the
outside (disorder, anarchy, plurality or environment), can
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be regarded as the source of identity. They should,
therefore, not constitute the central problematic of social
or psychological science. It is the process of differentiation that counts.33
In a somewhat simpler form, the boundary is conceived as an
active process which continually constructs and constitutes
`difference' which in turn constructs and constitutes
`identity': "No longer an inert barrier, it emerges as a
dynamic liminal domain where the constant interplay of
difference continually constitutes meaning, knowledge and
identity - in short, forms of life (individual, group or state)."
Without difference, Dillon emphasizes, there is no identity.
We learn through Dillon's post-modern disquisition that
"the subject (of security) is both the subject and object of
security policies." That is, as surely as the subject
inaugurates and promotes and develops security policies, it
is `had' by them in the sense that these policies contribute to
the process of differentiation which lies at the root of
identity. Despite the difficult and somewhat prohibitive
style, we learn that the dominant discursive practices of
security manage `difference' "into otherness, a negative,
undeserving and threatening difference requiring destruction
or deterrence." He creatively restates the contemporary
understanding of the security dilemma a là John Herz in
terms of this typical process of differentiation:
... the urge to translate difference into otherness is a
common one, confined neither to West nor East. If I am
tolerant of different identities, there is no guarantee that
they will be equally tolerant of me. An identity that
differs from mine may well constitute me as other, and I
may have to try to fend it off. To establish or renew
myself, my identity might also require that I, in turn,
construe some difference as otherness. From this
perspective the study of security is concerned with the
construction of identity through the interplay of
difference and the imposition of otherness.34
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It is this common move, a move that has brought us to the
brink of nuclear war, that Dillon admonishes us to escape.
The post-structuralist "revitalization of politics," he strongly
contends, offers us a chance to reinstate the ambiguity and
indeterminateness of `identity' and accept (rather than
caricature) the necessity of difference.
Another example of the movement towards a
sociological approach can be found in the writings of Paul
Chilton. Chilton is concerned with analyzing security "in a
culture in general, and in various modes of discourse within
the culture." To this end he addresses the concept of security
in terms of linguistic analysis. While his goal is to meld
linguistics and international relations, he argues that the
approach is not as quixotic as it may appear at first glance,
and that it is congruent with the influence of the "cognitive
revolution" upon IR.35 Chilton argues that there are two broad
linguistic themes that can assist us in the analysis of
international relations: the first are theories of
communication and the second concerns theories of
underlying conceptual structures. It is the latter theme that
Chilton uses as his point of analytical departure. Chilton
begins his analysis with the straightforward observation that
the words security and secure are polysemic, that is, that the words
occur in numerous social contexts and tend to "pervade our
lives," and that at a result we can safely conclude that
security is "very much a cultural concept."36 Chilton notes
that cognitive semantics assumes that the meanings of words
are constructed upon "preconceptual structures" deriving to
a large extent from bodily experience. "Concepts from this
source domain," Chilton writes, "can be mapped into less
directly experienced, less well-comprehended domains."37
21Workman /     
38 Chilton, What Do We Mean by `Security'?, p. 8.
That is, words are rendered sensical through a process of
metaphorical mapping from simple experiences onto more
abstract levels. "The point here is that metaphor," Chilton
writes, "is a fundamental and unconscious principle in the
production of meaning."
Chilton identifies three relevant groups of metaphors
based upon bodily experience. The first is the CONTAINER
schema, with three crucial elements including interior,
boundary, and surface. The accessing of the CONTAINER
schema is extremely common. "All day long humans go in
and go out, especially so in urban environments; they are in
and out of states of mind; in and out of clothes; they take in
air and let out air; they ingest food and excrete it; they are
`insiders' and `outsiders' with respect to social groups." The
second preconceptual structure is that of the PATH schema.
This source domain "involves structural elements such as a
starting point (origin), destination (endpoint), path, and
directedness toward the endpoint." In terms of the metaphors
that may be mapped from this domain Chilton draws out
attention to the concept of purpose, and especially national
purpose. "We can talk of going a long way toward our
purposes, meeting obstacles on the way, getting there in the end,
and so on." The third important source domain focuses upon
FORCE DYNAMICS. It is valuable in this respect to quote
directly from Chilton: "This image schema derives from the
physical experience of pressure and resistances, both exerted
and received - i.e., from pushing and striking and from being
struck and pushed. The most important cases are probably
the experience of lateral push and pull, gravitational force
and the experience of balance.38
With respect to the higher level concept of security
Chilton argues that these source domains of CONTAINER,
PATH and FORCE DYNAMICS are accessed as part of the
construction of meaning. With respect to the concept of
security he identifies two common metaphorizations. First,
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security comes to mean something that is fixed or firmly
held in place: "... one of the conceptual elements in our
understanding of security is connected to the absence of
motion, to stasis, and more precisely to the physical restraint
of undesired motion." As a consequence we are prone to
speak, he contends, in terms of "tight security" or "loose
security" or to collocate security with stability. The second
image schema that is frequently accessed is the
CONTAINER. In this sense, if something is secure then it
cannot be entered or exited, and, since containers have an
inside and an outside, then to be secure is to prevent
movement in and out. Common expressions of this nature
include the idea of being "secure in one's beliefs", a
"penetration of security", or "security leaks", or of "holes or
breaches in security". 
Chilton argues that these conceptualizations help to
make certain conceptualizations of security plausible, and
can profoundly influence dominant discourses around
security. With respect to the United States, for example,
Chilton notes that the CONTAINER schema has been
particularly influential in post-war security doctrines,
especially the Doctrine of Containment. Chilton argues that
the US is now in a "critical discourse moment," particularly
in the sense that the CONTAINER metaphors seem less and
less viable: "New thinking is required in the west as in the
Soviet Union. The United States is seeking to formulate a
policy concept `beyond containment'; the Soviet Union has
introduced openness concepts into international political
discourse with the notion of Glasnost - the reverse of the
CONTAINER schemas." The implicit tenor of Chilton's
work is that the construction of meaning through metaphor
contributes to the resiliency of particular conceptions of
security. Linguistic plausibility is not in itself a sufficient
explanation for security policy. Rather, Chilton is concerned
with providing an explanation of the perseverance or
"historical memory" of conceptions of security in the minds
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of both analysts and policy makers.39 It would follow from
this, that this resiliency would partly explain why alternative
`meanings' of security within society might remain
peripheral.
Simon Dalby's Geopolitics and Security Discourse provides an
excellent example of the relationship between prevailing
conceptions of security on the one hand and the post-
structuralist themes of identity and difference on the other.
Dalby begins by observing that the hegemonic conception of
security in the post-war period in the United States is
inherently geopolitical, especially the manner in which
geopolitics refers to the relationship between power and the
control of territory. He identifies the common process
constructing "exotic Others and disciplining domestic
selves," and of then defining "their [the Others] place as
different from ours." Dalby notes that the common theme
underlying these moves is the conception of security as "the
spatial exclusion of Others." Although the terms ` geopolitics'
often gets left out of the discussion, the dominant debates on
US security are:
... structured within understanding of political power in spatial terms,
within an implicit division of political space into territorially
demarcated states. These states in turn are strategically
important because of their location in terms of
geopolitics. The presence of geopolitics here is clear, the
geographical occupation of the Machinderian heartland
and the potential Soviet domination of the Eurasian
landmass are persistent themes of American security
discourse, even if the term geopolitics is rarely
mentioned. Operational foreign policy was structured in
terms of an implicit geopolitical understanding of global
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events in which the motive force is the bilateral
competition of the USSR and the "free world" led by the
U.S. This competition, and with it deterrence as the key
to Western survival, necessitates a global militarisation
to contain the expansion of the totalitarian sphere led by the
USSR. All the principal aspects of the political discourse
of post-war U.S. politics are present here. In combination
they acted to limit the fields of discourse, asking
ultimately "but what about the Russians?" to close off
potentially counterhegemonic formulations.40
It underlines strategic thinking and sovietology, he contends,
and gives meaningful shape to the doctrine of containment:
"All the arguments for containment, drawn from various
disciplines and political discourses understood security as a
matter of spatial limitation of other powers." For Dalby, the
construction of otherness is intimately linked to underlying
spatial currents. In speaking especially of the U.S., he notes
that projects such as the Strategic Defense Initiative are
founded upon the specification of a spatially excluded
otherness:
Others are spatially excluded, to be feared, ostracised,
and ultimately reduced to extensions of an imposed
identity. Security is identified as identity, unity and an
imposed order. Difference is a threat, Otherness has to be
spatially contained, ultimately reduced to an extension of
sameness, implies a reduction of difference, making their
space like ours. Inherent in all this are conceptions of
absolute space, and the metaphysical construction of a
universalist epistemological position where true
knowledge triumphs, gradually extending through
absolute space.41
Dalby admonishes the reader that we should not
underestimate the degree to which this prevailing
formulation of security concerns has shaped U.S. policy,
especially the underlying U.S. foreign policy themes of
Atlanticism (Euro-American political economy of liberal
capitalism with its political, cultural and economic
arrangements) and the Containment doctrine.
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The socially constructed nature of the language of
security is most clearly presented in Rob Walker's Canadian Security
Policy and the Language of War at Peace.42 Walker begins his study with a very
blunt question: "Is it possible for Canadians to speak
coherently and effectively about peace and security?" In
sketching out an answer to this question he asserts that a
complex "discourse" or "rhetoric" or "culture" of military
affairs can be identified in Canada: "They invoke authority
and expertise. They give meanings to certain terms and
exclude those who do not speak properly from the
conversation. In short, they engage in a politics of language."
Walker then focuses upon the question of what is meant by
the infinitive "to speak." In his response he draws attention
to the political nature of language, to the mechanisms that
shape or amplify or distort or silence some types of
communication, and to more fundamental questions about
the relationship between language and power, a relationship
that determines who gets to speak, about which type of
speech is permissible, about tacit understandings
surrounding speech, and about the process through which
some images ascend in terms of cultural importance. Walker
assumes the constitutive nature of language in general, that
is, that language does not merely `refer' to an outside world
but rather makes and remakes it. He observes that people
themselves are constituted by language, and, in contrast to
the cynic's assumption, attempt to tell the truth. The
recognition, he writes, of the intimate relationship between
`language' and ` security' has been lost upon those within the
security field:
To flirt with language, or rhetoric, or discourse, or the
cultural production of militarization is, by definition - the
self-definition of the professional analysts and policy
advisors - to admit professional incompetence.
Machiavelli may have offered sage advice about the need
to appear virtuous, and Clausewitz may have offered
timely warnings about the intemperate passions of
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democratic society, but in the end, security, it is said, is
about hard realities and immediate necessities. Some
things are important, some are not, and, according to the
conventional wisdom, the politics of language hardly merit a passing footnote.
Peace and security call for pragmatism and action, for
logistics and technological expertise, for hardware and
bullets. The rest is all talk.43
Walker stresses that the security dialogue is fundamentally
about the politics of language despite the protestations of the
security community. It is valuable to quote him at length:
The trouble is that it is not only the rest that is all talk. Missiles may well stand
silent in their silos, but they are only part of enormously
complex systems of communication and control. They fit
into "strategies," "scenarios," and "postures" and are
directed at an "enemy," all of which are constructed on
the basis of certain articulations of the way the world is
or might be. Conjectures and imagination, secrecy and
disinformation, theory, hypothesis and historical memory
are all as much a part of the "reality" of security as the
hardware, fire-power or finger on the button. Military
experience is just as subject to codification and
romanticization with a sub-culture as any other area of
human experience. Thinking about peace and security
draws upon all kinds of cultural influences which find
their way into the everyday discourses of strategic
planners and front-line military personnel alike. Those
concerned with matters of peace and security may pay
little attention to the politics of language, but this does not mean that
they are not engaged in them.44
The very process of naming and defining permits analysts
and practitioners to `forget' the historical struggle behind
security concerns. The language of security elucidates and
obscures simultaneously. "Where part of the politics of
language depends on the fluidity of meanings, another part
depends on the practices of reification, on the crystalization
of flux into a claim of permanence." Elsewhere he writes:
"Language slips and translates. It fixes and reifies. Living
within language it is difficult to be aware of its effects,
impossible to know exactly how one is located within its
grammars and locutions." Most importantly, Walker
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emphasizes that no one can escape this fact of life: "To speak
is always to be caught within the cultural codes, rhetorical
motifs, philosophical assumptions and institutionalized
patterns of conversation that make speech possible." In the
end, Walker has placed security concerns and security
debates firmly within the discursive nature of social life,
thereby amplifying its distinctive political character.
How, we might ask, does Walker's emphasis upon the
social and political nature of security concerns and problems
differ from that identified by Arnold Wolfer's over thirty
years ago? We would have to answer this question by
stressing that security policy and security proclamations are,
for Walker, essentially about controlling and policing the
boundaries of security discussions, that is, about what can
and cannot be said: "... we are led to questions about the way
the limits of discussion are set, about the boundaries between
what can and what cannot be said, about what is taken
seriously and what can be dismissed as trivial."45 It follows
from this, as he points out, that what is not said about
security concerns are equally important. In the Canadian
case Walker notes that discussions of security are intimately
linked to discussions of national sovereignty, a move which
facilitates the policing of the boundaries of security debates
within Canada:
It is ... instructive to consider how the very focus on
sovereignty as an immediate policy makes it difficult for
Canadians to pursue the most fundamental questions
posed by contemporary forms of insecurity. What does
it mean to be secure? Whose security are we talking
about? Who gets to decide on what conception of
security is most appropriate? The great attraction of the
concept of state-sovereignty, of course, is that it provides
a clear answer to such questions. Indeed, as an answer, it
was once so persuasive that the questions came to be
regarded as trivial. It gave voice to a broad
understanding of political community bounded by clearly
demarcated borders and organized by the autonomous
authorities within.46
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Walker emphasizes that recent political trends, such as the
rising concerns surrounding environmental degradation, are
strongly suggesting that "the meaning of insecurity has
begun to be radically rewritten." Consequently, recent state
pronouncements concerning the nature of Canadian security
concerns, such as that found in the 1987 White Paper, tend
to follow an older, and increasingly antiquated, script.
With this we can begin to clearly see how Wolfers'
`politics of security' and Walker's ` politics of security' differ
fundamentally. For the former writer, the politics of security
proceeds according to a basic agreement or consensus
around fundamental security concerns. Clearly, for Wolfers,
the difficulties of establishing the `core values' at issue
should not be overstated, and the protection of territorial
independence would necessarily rank high among these.
`Political' debates would tend to focus upon instrumentalities
of achieving `security', of having decision makers set the
appropriate level and choose the appropriate means. Wolfers'
acknowledgement that we know "roughly" what is meant
when we appeal to national security underscores the intra-
discursive nature of his discussion; the `political' is housed
within the same security discourse. For Walker, in stark
contrast, the political aspects of security refers to the clear
possibility of alternative or fundamentally antagonistic
security rhetorics and meanings. The pale of the political is
much broader that the realm of policy. Here, the political
nature of security is about the manner in which dominant
security concerns are established and reproduced, and about
the possibility of alternative security discourses
fundamentally challenging the dominant characterization. It
is about security concerns in the wider context of a
somewhat fractionated and "expansive" political culture, not
the `holistic' and `inclusive' context embodied in Wolfers
reference to "the nation." To collapse politics into narrower
policy debates is to succumb, as Walker puts it, to the "lure
of the Prince."
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Elements of a New Approach to Security and International Relations
The state centred approach and the attendant notion of national
security has traditionally dominated the field: "A subject that is
only remotely related to central political problems of threat
perception and management among sovereign states," Nye
and Lynn-Jones affirm, "would be regarded as peripheral."47
The Alternative group of security researchers, however, are
collectively swathing a new approach to the problem of
security in international relations. They are no longer content
to search for new definitions of national security. The definitional
exercise is firmly supplanted by an approach which seeks to
extol the intensely social and political nature of the concept
of security."48
The contours of this Alternative approach to security and
international relations must still be set out. The writings of
the Alternative school carry serious limitations, limitations which
reflect the fact that the writings are largely informed from
the post-modernist vantage point. At the risk of oversimplification,
while these writings are particularly strong with respect to
the analysis of security in the context of language and
culture, they still fail to adequately assess the cultural
dimensions of security in terms of relatively basic structural
relations of power within society. In other words, the
concept of security is not explicitly contemplated from the
perspective of dominant and subordinate classes and groups
within society. A few examples with respect to class power
will suffice to illustrate this point. R.B.J. Walker, for
example, lucidly and persuasively contends that some
conceptions of security are `policed at the margins'. But we
do not learn which classes or groups might be benefiting by
the patrol. Basic questions and considerations are
unfortunately overlooked. What is the relationship between
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the capitalist class in Canada and the ` policed' conception of
security? Were the interests of the capitalist class the
formational forces behind the prevailing view of security in
Canada? Is there a class alliance behind the prevailing view?
How might this prevailing conception of security tie into
other prevailing political discourses, such as neo-liberalism,
which have `clearer' class links within Canada? Equally
importantly, what class dynamics lie behind attempts to
transform dominant conceptions of security in Canada?
Similarly, although Simon Dalby writes that prevailing
conceptions of security can better reflect the interests of
some groups over the interests of others, there is little or no
attempt to identify any classes in this respect. Again, we
should inquire about the class dynamics and struggles that
might lie behind this tendency to universalize conceptions of
security across society. In what manner, for example, does
the prevailing view contribute to the blurring or
mystification of class relations? In what manner does the
prevailing conception of security damper or mute class
antagonisms or, alternatively, how does it fetter subordinate
class projects? To what extent does the universalized
conception of security incorporate the struggles or
aspirations of the subordinate classes? None of these
questions are ever posed. Again, while Paul Chilton suggests
that some understandings of security have greater resiliency
partly by virtue of the metaphors that they draw upon, he is
completely silent about the class projects which may lie
behind this resiliency. We are never afforded any analysis of
fundamental class divisions within society that may
underline, inform, exploit or actively promote the original
conceptualizations. And finally, while Mick Dillon contends
that the contorted construction of ` Otherness' in the post-war
period has brought us to the brink of nuclear annihilation, we
are not afforded any analysis, or even a hint for that matter,
of the relationship that this construction might have to the
struggles of international capitalist classes in the post-war
period. In what manner does this construction, we might also
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ask, conveniently enter into and `soften' the class struggle
`back home'?
In short, security is not analyzed in terms of the basic
class fissures embedded in the social canvas. Nor is the need
to do this acknowledged. Paradoxically, while these writings
refreshingly celebrate the political nature of security in one
sense, the failure to adequately extend the analysis to basic
configurations of social power within society, especially
class power and class struggle, tends to give these writings
an apolitical hue. One task of this study is to reassert, in the
strongest possible terms, that a complete analysis of security
must include considerations of class and other social
relations of power. With this affirmation in mind, we note
that a `complete' analysis of the social and political
dimensions of security will include two pivotal themes: First,
an examination of security in terms of the rudimentary
relations of power within society. Secondly, an examination of
security within the broad context of culture, a process well
underway in the Alternative group of security analysts. Although
these two themes are treated separately, there is no intention
here of committing an isolationist fallacy by arguing that
culture and relations of power in society somehow represent
separate and distinct spheres of social life. The separation is
for analytical identification only.
Theme One: Security and Social Relations of Power
We must examine the way in which conceptions of security
are bound up with the historically contingent but
conjuncturally specific relations of power embedded in the
social canvas. Included here are the social relations of
production (class defined primarily in terms of the mode of
production) and other social relations including gender and
race. More directly, we must explore the manner in which
conceptions of security are conditioned by the class dialectic
along with the specificities of gender and race. This theme is
premised upon the belief that prevalent ideas about society
will be profoundly related to its dominant power relations, a
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premise drawing on the orientation of historical materialist
critiques. In considering security from the perspective of the
dialectic among social classes and groups within society we
are making the claim that conceptions of security will
reflect, in other words, the basic socio-political struggles
within society. No conception of security will be politically
innocent in that it transcends these social struggles.
The recognition that prevailing conceptions of security
can be linked to specific interests within society underscores
the distinct possibility that subordinate class and groups,
such as the working class or women, may have
fundamentally different conceptions of security. Those
factors deemed to be most threatening to subordinate social
classes may be largely marginalized by the dominant
security discourse. The clear likelihood exists that any
`discourse of threat' among women, for example, may be
fundamentally at odds with the prevailing notions of ` threat'.
These marginalized discourses on security will largely
reflect basic struggles between dominant and subordinate
groups within society. The fact that there can be multiple
discourses around security raises an additional set of
analytical problems including inter alia the relationship between
these various conceptions and wider elements of social
consciousness, especially ideology. Multiple discourses
around security and insecurity, for example, may be bound
up with the inability for ruling classes and groups to
establish ideological hegemony. We might also explore the
manner in which competing views of security are aired
within the state apparatus, particularly if we suspect that the
prevailing security discourse might only be firmly lodged
within the military.
Theme Two: Security and Culture
The concept of security must be approached "less in terms of
any coherent technical definition of national security," Rob
Walker writes, "than of the way the concept of security
enters into all kinds of other codes, symbols, rhetorics,
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propagandas, ideologies, discourses, and other terms usually
subsumed under the generic concept of culture." The need to
examine the relationship between security and culture arises
from at least two basic observations. First, there is the idea of
culture as context. As the work of Paul Chilton helps us see,
language permeates the social consciousness and maintains
a certain resiliency; it can affect politics by conditioning
people quite independently of any immediately apparent
configuration of social power. Moreover, the concept of
security links to other dimensions of contemporary culture.
Security clichés such as Hawk and Dove "connect the world
of national security with the art gallery, sports stadium,
kindergarten and drive-in movie."49 Secondly, there is the idea of
culture as a political front. We must recognize that any effort to
transform relations of domination and subordination and
recast social practices must consider the relationship
between `ideas' and social change, and address the manner
in which `new' ideas can create resistant social practices.
When the two aspects of this alternative approach are
melded together an almost infinite number of research
themes are possible. This Alternative approach will also help us
to avoid some common errors that have been made in past
approaches to security. A brief discussion of these errors,
many of which have been identified in the alternative
writings will be very valuable:
The Problem of Universalization
We must avoid the mistake of universalizing conceptions of
security by privileging widely held or dominant views on the
matter. "The possibilities that there may be other interests
within the nation state whose security might be better served
in other ways," writes Simon Dalby, "is usually neatly
excluded by the simple ideological operation of
universalising the particular interests of a narrow segment of
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the population within the ambit of the concept of national security."
While this move might be more recognizable in government
policy statements and documentation, analytical approaches
which begin and end with the national security problem also
privilege, in varying degrees, conceptions of security
favoured by ruling classes and dominant groups within the
nation state. This is especially true to the extent that these
approaches emphasize certain core values such as the integrity of
the state apparatus, or they speak of a hierarchy of vital interests
established by the nation, or that they discuss internal threats to the
state. This is not to suggest that analysts of security are the
mere mouthpieces of ruling groups or institutions within
society, although this dynamic is undoubtably played out:
"The road from academia to the foot of the prince," Walker
reminds us, "is lined with comfortable institutes, specialized
funding organizations, aggressive consulting firms and large
quantities of cash." While analysts can and do participate in
ideological production of this type, the links are likely less
infusionist and more contextual in nature. The definitional
exercise, for example, that is, the struggle to find the
appropriate parameters and boundaries of national security, accepts
this as the correct way to characterize security problems. In
discussions about the appropriate definition of national security,
moreover, specific conceptual categories and academic
discourses are frequently employed as givens. The uncritical
appropriation of concepts such as territorial integrity,
political integrity, core values, core interests, vital interests,
internal threats, nation, state and national values unwittingly
reproduces and legitimizes a wider political discourse which
assists in maintaining specific and often highly repressive
configurations of social power within society. As long as we
proceed as though these analytical categories are divinely
inspired the mirth of the Gods will be on our account. To
speak of a insurgent group as a `threat' to the state, for
example, is a politically loaded move, and one which buys
into the dominant characterization of social problems.
Security issues of the `top-dogs' (Galtung's phrase) are
unwittingly privileged and extended across society.
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The Reification of Analytical Categories
The second common error that the alternative approach to
security will avoid is the reification of analytical categories.
The most flagrant error in this regard surrounds the idea of
the security dilemma. In the writings of John Herz, the
security dilemma was `deduced' or `distilled' from third
imagistic assumptions. The multi-state system simply creates
insuperable dynamics wherein the struggle for greater
security leads to spirals of power struggles which rendered
international relations inherently unstable. As long as there
are states, so the Herzian view must run, there will be
security dilemmas similar to the Cold War era. The security
dilemma reflects the `essence' of international relations, not
the contamination of social and political struggles in the
post-war period. It has, so to speak, a life of its own, at least
in the sense that its only contingency is the presence of the
state system or some facsimile thereof. While the approach
was first employed to describe conditions commonly
perceived at the time of the Cold War, recent writings regard
the security dilemma to be a basic condition or feature of
international relations.50 Leaving aside the question as to
whether this was an appropriate characterization of the
immediate post-war period, the permanent assignation of the
security dilemma to international relations effectively cuts it
off from all social relations. Something akin to one historical
era is presumed to be a kindred condition of all historical
periods. The security dilemma is cut loose from any aspect
of society and held to be relatively immune to it.
In contrast to this move, the alternative study of security
would emphasize that all security problems are contingent
upon the push and pull of social forces in society. Security
dilemmas, to the extent that this idea is useful, would be
anchored firmly in society. Threats and seemingly
intractable conditions for social actors (including parts of a
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state) are made by concrete social and political struggles, not
by the mere presence of the state system. Security dilemmas
reflect upward determinations from the social floor rather
than the downward determinations of the systemic ceiling.
In other words, the development and evolution of the
`security problematic' for states is fundamentally historical
and intimately tied to the evolution of social relations within
and between societies.
Another error of reification concerns the identification
of certain "core" security concerns. Understood usually as
the protection of political and territorial integrity, these
"core" concerns are then assumed to operate for all states at
all times. "Put more strongly," Azar and Moon argue, "this
way of conceiving national security is almost universal
across time and space as long as there exists an entity called
the nation-state." The caveat "almost" does not lesson the
fact that these "core" concerns can be identified apart from
the historical evolution of societies, and they are elevated to
the status of general truths. That is, the "core" concerns are
not understood in terms of any social contingency. Rather,
they are understood to operate notwithstanding the
imperatives of any particular societal dynamics. In contrast
to this, the alternative approach outlined would begin with
the assumption that there is a social contingency where
security issues are involved. One can even find numerous
exceptions, for example, to the apparently incontrovertible
truth of territorial integrity, `violations' that are clearly the
product of social dynamics within and between societies.
The Problem of Hypostatization
A third error concerns the tendency towards hypostatization.
That is, analysts must avoid premising their discussions of
security on the idea that there is some `real' or `objective' or
`independent' confluence of social conditions to which the
word `security' corresponds. Simply stated, analysts must
avoid assuming that the abstract concept of ` security' has any
real existence. In his discussion of Barry Buzan's
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contribution to the security literature Chilton argues that he
"assumes that the meaning of a word (such as security) is its
correlation with some entity or process out there in the real
world." As Chilton notes, Buzan speaks of the meaning of
security in the general sense, of transferring this meaning of
security to "specific entities like states" and of discovering
the "referent object of security." As Chilton argues, "the
presence of the word (in this case security) does not mean
that a corresponding entity exists in the `real' world."
Other writers are equally prone to Buzan's move.
Numerous discussions of national security proceed on the
assumption that there some actual configuration of events or
circumstances characteristic of a "secure society." That is,
the correct meaning of national security is the linguistic
conformation of some real state of `secure' affairs for the
`nation'. Indeed, the writings aimed at redefining the
meaning of national security intend to use the definition to contour
domestic and foreign policy with the goal of achieving this
`real' or `total' security. The cut of the exercise, in other
words, is thoroughly correlative. The alternative approach to
security studies offered here would help guard against
hypostatization in that it explicitly draws attention towards
the relationship between the employment of the concept of
security by actors within society on the one hand and the
broader cultural and social relational context on the other.
Politics and perceptions are our plot. We must seek to understand the various
conceptions of security and security issues as social
constructions rather than as ` reflections of' or ` references to'
some `external' reality.
The Denial of Politics
Finally, the cumulative effect of the alternative approach to
security is to explicitly draw attention to the political nature
of all security problematizations. In speaking of scholarly
discussions of security Rob Walker notes: "Contemporary
discourse about security draws attention to the intensely
political character of concepts that have been naturalized and
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rendered relatively apolitical within the discipline." Our
discussion underscores a view which sees security
problematizations and discussions as fiercely political in at
least two ways. First, characterizations of security are
contaminated by basic social relations and the wider cultural
milieu. There is no `natural' security problem or scenario
defined into our midst. Secondly, scholarly inquiries into
security, as with all scholarly inquiries within international
relations and beyond, are stained by the wider social and
cultural setting. The only relief from this condition is by
pretension. We must guard against losing sight of the
political nature and effect of the analytical categories. "The
very terms themselves," stresses Ian Forbes, "must be treated
with the utmost suspicion."51 We do this, ultimately, in
recognition of the fact that international relations theory
stands as a form of power/knowledge: "To speak of security
on terms other than those of Realism and Idealism ... is to
confront a brick wall, the palpable limits of permitted
discourse."52
Conclusion
The contribution of the Alternative school of security studies has
created a consonance between IR scholarship and
contemporary efforts to redefine security issues in the post-
Cold War era. Groups in danger of further political
marginalization in the context of the neo-liberal globalizing
economy, including women's organizations, labour groups
and the ecological movement, regularly enlist ideas of
security in the context of their efforts. Appeals to security
are now routinely voiced outside of the idea of statehood,
citizenship and militarism in favour of community, humanity
and empowerment. IR scholarship thus helps to create a
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legitimating intellectual birth for these overtly political
efforts historically considered to be on the margins of global
politics. This is a radical departure for the IR field given its
historical trajectory, one characterized by exceptionally close
ties to narrowly understood foreign policy communities.
Although somewhat more conventional approaches to
security studies are far from vanishing, their claims are now
systematically challenged and their conservative political
connotations more fully explored.
